Reseña del libro "U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress (en Inglés)"
This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and records major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, President Clinton reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic alignment against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral engagement have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and the PLA's aggressive maritime and air confrontations. Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). A particular issue is whether the President is required to issue waivers of sanctions. Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts achieve results in U.S. objectives and whether the contacts contribute to the PLA's warfighting capability that might harm U.S. and allied security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include risk-reduction or conflict-avoidance; military-civilian coordination; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks on nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA accounting. Policy makers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about potential crises and conflicts. U.S. officials have faced challenges in gaining cooperation from the PLA. The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S.-only "obstacles" (including arms sales to Taiwan, FY2000 NDAA, and air and naval reconnaissance operations). The PRC's harassment of U.S. ships and increasing assertiveness in maritime disputes showed some limits to mil-to-mil engagement, similar views, and PLA restraint. The U.S. articulations in 2011-2012 of a strategic "rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific raised an issue of how to deal with China's challenges. The Administration's "rebalance" entails not only expanded engagement with the PLA, but also increasing exercises. The PLA Navy's invited participation for the first time in the U.S. Navy-led multinational exercise, RIMPAC, based at Hawaii in summer 2014 raised concerns in Congress and elsewhere. The U.S. Navy has increased some "interoperability" with the PLA Navy. The Defense Secretary issued the latest required annual report on June 5, 2014, concerning military and security developments involving the PRC, cooperation, and military-to-military contacts. The report noted that the PLA uses combined exercises to improve capabilities by learning from more advanced militaries and asserted that the Defense Department complies with the FY2000 NDAA in all military contacts with China. The U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander sent a C-17 transport aircraft to China's Zhuhai Air Show in November 2014.
